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INDIA’S REMOVAL OF KASHMIR’S SPECIAL PROTECTION STATUS:
AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT?
By Gita Howard*
ABSTRACT
India abrogated Articles 370 and 35A of its Constitution in August of 2019,
effectively removing Kashmir’s longstanding special protection status.
Kashmir’s special protection status provided Kashmiris with an additional
degree of autonomy than India’s states, and its revocation left Kashmir under
greater control of Delhi. 1 Several organizations flagged human rights
concerns regarding the sudden revocation of the region’s special protection
status and the subsequent lockdown. This article seeks to narrowly address
whether the removal of Kashmir’s special protection status was a violation of
international law. This article demonstrates that although Kashmiris’
internal right to self-determination may serve as a theory for illegality under
International law, the right to self-determination must be balanced against
India’s national security interests and duty to protect. Thus, India’s removal
of Kashmir’s special protection status was likely an internationally lawful act.

J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2017, Scripps
College. I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Daniela Tagtachian for all her
mentorship and guidance.
1
Delhi refers to the capital of India, the seat of the Indian Government.
*
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I.
INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND KASHMIR
A.
THE REGION OF KASHMIR PRIOR TO THE INDIAPAKISTAN PARTITION
To examine whether India’s revocation of Kashmir’s special
protection status was in breach of international law, it is necessary to
detail the long and complex history of Jammu and Kashmir
(interchangeably referred to as “Kashmir” or “J&K”). Today, Kashmir
is situated in the northern region of the Indian subcontinent, bound in
the northeast by the Uygur region of Xinjiang, to the east by Tibet and
the Chinese-administered portions of Kashmir, to the south by Indian
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states, to the southwest by Pakistan, and to the northwest by the
Pakistani-administered portion of Kashmir. 2
Before the India-Pakistan partition of 1947, Kashmiris enjoyed
relative religious and cultural harmony. 3 In fact, local leaders
described the community as kashmiriyat, a term which translates to
“Kashmir amity,” to explain the peaceful and amicable relations
between faiths and cultures in the region. 4 Despite religious
diversity—Islamism, Buddhism, and Hinduism—the shared Kashmiri
identity was strong, as evidenced by the frequent blending of religious
practices across faith lines. 5 According to the 1941 Census, Muslims
formed 72.41 percent of the population, while Hindus formed 25.01
percent of the population in the region. 6 According to a 2013 report
from the Berkeley Center, the Kashmir Valley population was 95
percent Muslim, the Jammu region was 67 percent Hindu, and the
Ladakh region was Tibetan Buddhist majority at 50 percent. 7
In the early nineteenth century, the British assumed colonial
rule over the Indian subcontinent, including the Kashmir region. 8
Once Britain assumed control over India, Britain categorized Kashmir
as a “princely state,” or one of the autonomous regions that spanned
the Indian subcontinent, 9 and granted it quasi-autonomy. 10 Notably,
in the 1930s, parallel with the Indian independence movement,
Kashmiris initiated a “Free Kashmir” movement for independence

Rais Akhtar, Jammu and Kashmir, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/
Jammu-and-Kashmir (last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
3
See BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., GEO. UNIV., KASHMIR:
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY BECOMES RELIGIOUS MILITANCY 6 (2013).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Fahad Nabeel, Altering Demographics of Indian-Held Kashmir, CENTRE FOR
STRATEGIC AND CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, (Jan. 17, 2017), https://cscr.pk/explore/
themes/politics-governance/altering-demographics-indian-held-kashmir/.
7
BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3.
8
Mehdi Zakerian & Negin Sobhani, International Humanitarian Laws and Laws of
War: Kashmir, 3 INT’L STUD. J. 1, 4 (2006).
9
Angma D. Jhala, The Indian Princely States and Their Rulers, OXFORD RESEARCH
ENCYCLOPEDIAS, https://oxfordre.com/asianhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/97801902
77727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-355.
10
Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 4.
2
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from the British regime. 11 As the end of World War II and British
decolonization loomed, Britain passed the Indian Independence Act. 12
Although the British and Indian National Congress advocated
for a secular and pluralistic democracy, the All-India Muslim League,
a political group founded in 1906 to ensure the rights of Indian
Muslims, 13 ascribed to a two-nation theory which supported dividing
the region into two nations based on religion—Hindus in India and
Muslims in Pakistan. 14 Central to this proposition was the fear that
Muslims could not adequately have their interests supported in a
majority Hindu state. 15 However, some scholars highlight that many
Muslims in what became West Pakistan were not in favor of the two
nation theory. 16
B.

KASHMIR DURING THE INDIA-PAKISTAN PARTITION

During partition, Kashmir was placed into a particularly
difficult predicament. When British rule concluded, the unofficial
stance was that each state was to decide whether to accede to India or
to Pakistan. 17 Initially, the then-leader of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari
Singh, held off on making a decision and joined neither India nor
Pakistan. 18 Pakistan opposed Singh’s hold out and viewed it as
illogical because Kashmir was a majority-Muslim state. 19 Meanwhile,
India had an interest in obtaining the Kashmir territory because it was
an important strategic barrier between Pakistan and India. 20
Furthermore, India had concerns about the Hindu-majority parts of
Kashmir. 21 Regardless of both states’ individual stakes in the Kashmir
11

Id.
Id.
13
BRITANNICA, Muslim League, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Muslim-League
(last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
14
Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 4-5.
15
Christine Fair, False Equivalency in the “Indo-Pakistan” Dispute, WAR ON THE
ROCKS (June 16, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/06/false-equivalency-in-theindo-pakistan-dispute/.
16
See id.
17
Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 5.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
12
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territory, Singh requested a standstill agreement with both India and
Pakistan, writing two telegrams to India and Pakistan.” 22 Pakistan
telegraphed back to express assent to the standstill agreement. 23
In response, India requested additional discussions before
signing the standstill agreement, stating that the “Government of India
would be glad if you or some other Minister duly authorized in this
behalf could fly to Delhi for negotiating [the] Standstill Agreement
between [the] Kashmir Government and Indian dominion,” but no
representative went to Delhi or concluded an agreement. 24
In October of 1947, Pakistani militias from tribal areas
mobilized to invade Kashmir, triggering the beginning of the enduring
Kashmir conflict and a series of three Indo-Pakistan wars. 25 Regular
Pakistani military personnel also accompanied the tribesmen during
the invasion. 26 There is a debate as to whether this invasion constitutes
a violation of the aforementioned standstill agreement, as Pakistan
does not take ownership for the invasion—however, research indicates
that Pakistan gave national and provincial support to these tribesmen
invaders. 27 As the tribal invaders made their way to Srinagar, the
largest city in Kashmir, and Singh requested India’s assistance to fend
off the invasion, 28 India agreed to defend Kashmir if in turn, Kashmir
agreed to accede to India. 29 Singh signed an instrument of accession
on October 26, 1947, accompanied with a letter detailing his intentions
behind the accession to the then-Governor-General of India, Lord
Mountbatten. 30 The Instrument of Accession provided:
I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India . . . I
hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State and

Surendra Chopra, Kashmir in the United Nations, 25 THE INDIAN J. OF POL. SCI.
124, 126 (1964).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 5; see also Fair, supra note 15.
26
Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s Endgame in Kashmir, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE (July 1, 2003). https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/
index.cfm?fa=view&id=1427.
27
Fair, supra note 15.
28
Id.
29
Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 6.
30
Id.
22
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that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of this State
is to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors. 31
The instrument of accession, while granting Jammu and
Kashmir autonomy in its own internal and local affairs, further
allocated several aspects of governance to India, including military
defense, external affairs, and communications. 32 However, Pakistan
has questioned the existence of this instrument because debate exists
about when the signed instrument of accession reached New Delhi. 33
Lord Mountbatten’s response to Singh’s letter, dated October
27, 1947, calls into question whether the correct procedures were
followed after the accession. The letter stated:
My Government has decided to accept the accession of
Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy
that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the
subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in
accordance with the wishes of the people of the State. It is my
Government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been restored
in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s
accession should be settled by a reference to the people. 34
From Kashmir’s accession to India onward, Pakistan has
argued that India is holding Kashmiri Muslims captive and disputed
the accession, while India has contended that Singh’s accession to
India was achieved through partition, an internationally agreed upon
practice. 35 During this first Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan acquired one
third of Kashmir’s territory, and India retained the remaining land. 36

31
INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR, (1947), http://jklaw.nic.in/
instrument_of_accession_of_jammu_and_kashmir_state.pdf.
32
Id.
33
Christine, supra note 15.
34
Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note 8, at 6-7.
35
BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 5.
36
Fair, supra note 15. Pakistan ceded a portion of Kashmir to China as part of a border
agreement, and China occupied a part of Indian Kashmir during the 1962 Indo-China
War. Factbox – India, China’s old border dispute, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2009), https://
www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-43780820091108.

2021 REMOVAL OF KASHMIR'S SPECIAL PROTECTION STATUS
C.

499

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 47

At this point of the conflict, India took the Kashmir query to
the United Nations (“UN”), which resulted in the UN Security Council
Resolution 47 of 1948 (“Security Council Resolution 47”). 37 The
Security Council Resolution 47 called for a plebiscite in order to
establish the will of the Kashmiri people. 38 No plebiscite has since been
held—a fact that Pakistan often highlights in discussions surrounding
the Kashmir dispute. 39 However, a lesser known fact is that the UN set
forth conditions before the plebiscite could be held—conditions that
Pakistan never fulfilled. 40 The UN mandated that first, Pakistan should
withdraw its forces:
The Government of Pakistan should . . . secure withdrawal
from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani
nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the state for
the purpose of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of
such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in
the State . . . . 41
Second, the resolution determined that once Pakistan
withdrew its forces, India should withdraw its own forces, “[w]hen it
is established . . . that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that
arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective,
put into operation . . . a plan for withdrawing their own forces from
Jammu and Kashmir…” 42 And thirdly, once the two prior conditions
were met, the resolution established that the Government of India
should issue a plebiscite. 43
Consequentially, though it is often mentioned that India never
issued a plebiscite to determine the will of the Kashmiri people under
the Security Council Resolution, it is rarely explained that Pakistan
failed to meet the first prerequisite under the resolution, a necessary
See Security Council Res. 47, U.N. Doc. S/RES/47 (1948) [hereinafter S.C. Res.
47].
38
See id.; see also Fair, supra note 15. As discussed earlier, this plebiscite was first
established by Lord Mountbatten, and then carried on by the UN.
39
Fair, supra note 15.
40
Id.
41
S.C. Res. 47, supra note 37, at 4.
42
Id. at 5.
43
Id. at 5-6.
37
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condition for the plebiscite—the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from
Kashmir. 44 In 1956, Indian Prime Minister Jarwharlal Nehru offered
the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, a plebiscite for
the whole of Kashmir, but Pakistan ultimately rejected the offer. 45
Furthermore, to this day, Pakistan has never withdrawn its forces—a
fact that is often overlooked by the world media, governments, and
human rights organizations. 46 Moreover, it is arguable whether the
plebiscite is relevant today, as the demographics in Kashmir have
altered dramatically as a result of ensuing conflict. 47
D.
INTEGRATING KASHMIR INTO INDIA’S LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
After Security Council Resolution 47 was issued in 1948, India
implemented legislation to legalize the status of Kashmir within its
national framework. In 1952, India formed an agreement with
Kashmir, known as the Delhi Agreement, which provided, “that
sovereignty in all matters other than those specified in the Instrument
of Accession continues to reside in the state,” and further affirmed the
State’s authority to establish permanent residents’ rights and
privileges. 48 To give effect to the Delhi Agreement, India enacted
Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution. 49
Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution granted the
region its special protection status. Article 370 came into effect in 1949
exempting Kashmir from the Indian Constitution with exception to
See id.; see also Fair, supra note 15.
Political turmoil during this period, as well as pressure from militant and aspiring
leader, Ayub Khan, contributed to this decision. See Zakerian & Sobhani, supra note
8.
46
See Aarti Tikoo, Pak-sponsored terror in Kashmir ‘ignored and overlooked” by
human rights activists: TOI journalist at US Congressional hearing, TIMES OF INDIA
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pak-sponsored-terror-inkashmir-ignored-and-overlooked-by-human-right-activists-toi-journalist-at-uscongressional-hearing/articleshow/71714515.cms.
47
See INDIA TODAY, Kashmir: Curious case of demographic realities and perceptions
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/kashmir-curiouscase-of-demographic-realities-and-perceptions-1582376-2019-08-19.
48
See L. Ali Khan, India Complicated the Kashmir Dispute, JURIST (Aug. 30, 2019),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/08/l-ali-khan-india-kashmir-dispute/.
49
Id.
44
45
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modifications made by the president and presidential order, 50 and
granted Kashmir the jurisdiction to create its own laws, aside from
laws specified in the Instrument of Accession relating to finance,
defense, foreign affairs, and communications. 51 Article 370 also
established a separate Kashmir constitution and flag and denied
property rights to non-residents of the region. 52 In 1954, Article 35A,
also known as “the Permanent Residents Law,” 53 allocated power to
the Kashmir legislative assembly to determine who may be a
permanent resident of the region, and granted particular special rights
and privileges to Kashmir citizens relating to property, public aid, and
welfare programs, as well as public sector jobs. 54 Because Article 35A
permitted Kashmir to define permanent residents and determine their
rights, the J&K legislature was also able to limit women’s property
rights, such that once women married outside nonpermanent
residents, they lost their permanent resident rights to inherit or own
property. 55 Moreover, some caste communities that came to Kashmir
as migrant laborers have also been discriminated against under
Articles 370 and 35A, and have been unable to benefit from welfare
programs and opportunities. 56 Thus, some have criticized Articles 370
and 35A because of their discriminatory impact. 57

50
Tariq Ahmad, FALQs: Article 370 and the Removal and Kashmir’s Special Status,
L. LIBR. OF CONG. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2019/10/falqs-article-370and-the-removal-of-jammu-and-kashmirs-special-status/.
51
Kashmir special protection status explained: What are Articles 370 and 35A?,
ALJAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/kashmirspecial-status-explained-articles-370-35a-190805054643431.html.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Update of the
Situation of Human Rights in Indian-Administered Kashmir and PakistanAdministered Kashmir from May 2018 to April 2019, (July 8, 2019), at para. 54.
55
Akanksha Khullar, Women’s Rights and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation
Act, 2019, INST. OF PEACE & CONFLICT STUD. (Dec. 24, 2019), http://www.ipcs.org/
comm_select.php?articleNo=5639.
56
See Pallavi Sareen, The Constitution is Allowing the Continued Discrimination of
Valmikis in J&K, THE WIRE (June 28, 2019), https://thewire.in/rights/jammu-andkashmir-article-35a-valmikis.
57
Khullar, supra note 55.
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ENDURING CONFLICT IN KASHMIR

Despite the implementation of Articles 370 and 35A, conflict
over Kashmir still persisted. Pakistan waged a second war against
India over Kashmir from April to September of 1965, where Indian
forces defeated Pakistan. 58 Since the conclusion of this second war,
India and Pakistan have steadier control over locations with a military
advantage—India holds the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh
regions, whereas Pakistan has maintained control over the Azad
Kashmir region as well as Gilgit-Baltistan. 59 In 1999, a third war
ensued over Kashmir, also referred to as the Kargil Conflict. 60 There,
Pakistani military units infiltrated the Kargil region, but were
ultimately deterred by Indian troops and international pressure. 61
Religious tensions fueled much of the most recent war with Pakistan
leaders resisting the secularization of society through the
implementation of a national Islamization program in Pakistan, and an
increasing popularity of Hindu nationalists within the Bharatiya
Janata Party (“BJP”), a right wing political party which has historically
reflected Hindu nationalist ideology. 62
Militant activity has greatly contributed to instability in the
Kashmir region. In response to disputed elections and general failures
of Indian governance in 1989, Pakistani militants initiated an
insurgency against Indian forces across the line of control. 63 The Indian
Government responded with “harsh counterinsurgency operations
that further alienate[d] much of the Muslim population of the Kashmir
Valley.” 64 Militant attacks on Indian forces as well as civilians caused
a major exodus of Hindu Pandits, a Brahmin caste that was a
privileged minority prior to partition. 65 Although numbers vary, it is
See Fair, supra note 15; see also BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD
AFFS., supra note 3, at 9.
59
BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 9.
60
Id.
61
See id.
62
See id. at 5.
63
See id. at 9.
64
See id.
65
The Hindu pandits had made up the majority of Hindus in Kashmir until the conflict
in 1989—since then many have been killed and many have fled sectarian violence.
See BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 9.
58
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estimated that 350,000 Pandits were forced to flee their homes
following threats from Islamist militants in the valley. 66 Some figures
estimate that today, 200,000 to 300,000 Pandits are living in exile as a
result of targeted killings to ethnically cleanse Pandits from the
region. 67 Militant activity has been fueled in large part by Pakistan, as
it has been verified that Pakistan has provided arms to militants who
train on their side of the line of control. 68 However, some have also
speculated that India has supported Baloch and Sindhi nationalists
who sought independence from Pakistan, although those allegations
remain unverified. 69 Regardless of who is to blame for militant
activity, a staggering amount of violence has been committed by
militant groups in Kashmir—it has been reported that anywhere from
30,000 to 100,000 civilians have been killed. 70
Unique geopolitical and religious factors have only fueled
tensions post-partition. The rise of violence in the Kashmir region can
be attributed to several factors including the strong presence of Indian
military forces, and Islamic militant violence. 71 Jihadists have also
entered the region with the Pakistani Government supporting their
actions. 72 As a report from Georgetown University’s Berkeley Center
for Religion, Peace & World Affairs (“Berkeley Center”) noted,
“Jihadist groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed were a useful tool for the
Pakistani Government: they effectively challenged Indian control of
Kashmir, provoked harsh repressive measures from the Indian
military, and allowed the regular Pakistani military to gain distance
from frontline hostilities.” 73 Moreover, tensions between India and
Pakistan are particularly heated because they are both nuclear
powers. 74

66
Sudha Ramachandran, Can Kashmir’s Pandits Ever Return Home?, The Diplomat
(Feb. 26, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/can-kashmirs-pandits-ever-returnhome/.
67
BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 9.
68
Id.
69
See Fair, supra note 15.
70
See BERKELEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS., supra note 3, at 9.
71
See id.
72
See id.
73
See id.
74
See id.
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India’s security forces’ response to the violence in Kashmir
poses another significant layer of concern. India’s responses to
Pakistan-backed separatism has included killings, tortures, and
disappearances. 75 These human rights violations are facilitated by law,
as the Indian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) grants broad
immunity to military personnel for human rights violations and
additionally provides armed forces personnel with “special powers” 76
when operating in certain areas that must be classified as
“disturbed.” 77 Authorities have relied extensively on administrative
detentions in the J&K region, with Amnesty International providing
that, “[a]t its lowest, the percentage of administrative detainees (within
the overall prison population) in J&K prisons was 11.5% (2008). This is
over 14 times higher than the national average.” 78 Additionally, the
Public Safety Act (“PSA”) violates several international human rights
laws and standards, as Amnesty International provided:
The PSA violates international human rights law and
standards by providing for detention without trial while denying the
possibility of judicial review and other safeguards for those in
detention required under international human rights law. It also
violates the principle of legality by defining offences so broadly as to
allow security officials to detain individuals on extremely vague

Meenakshi Ganguly, India Needs to Step Back in Kashmir, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/12/india-needs-step-backkashmir#.
76
The special powers concerned involve the right open fire if the officer is “of the
opinion that it is necessary to do so for the maintenance of public order…”, arrest
without warrant with at least reasonable suspicion, and to enter and search without
warrant to make an arrest or recover a person or property wrongfully restrained or
stolen. See Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, No. 28 of 1958, art. 4.
77
The Act provides that ana rea may be disturbed if, “the Governor of Assam or the
Chief Commissioner of Manipur is of the opinion that the whole or any part of the
State of Assam or the Union Territory of Manipur, as the case may be, is in such a
disturbed or dangerous condition that the use of armed forces in aid of the civil powers
in necessary, he may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the whole or any
part of the State or Union territory to be a disturbed area.” Id. See also Amnesty
International, A ‘Lawless Law,” Detentions under the Jammu and Kashmir Public
Safety Act, (March 2011), at 10.
78
Amnesty International, supra note 77, at 12.
75
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grounds including for exercising their rights to peaceful assembly and
freedom of expression. 79
Thus, the aforementioned history paints a picture of Indiacontrolled Jammu and Kashmir up to the time of the writing of this
article, notwithstanding Delhi’s recent decision to abrogate Articles
370 and 35A.
II.
REMOVAL OF KASHMIR’S SPECIAL PROTECTION STATUS:
ABROGATION OF ARTICLES 370 AND 35A OF THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION
In August of 2019, the Indian Parliament passed, with
President Ram Nath Kovin_’s signature, legislation to remove both
Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution. 80 The rationale behind
the move cited the “temporary” nature of the provisions, economic
development, and gender discrimination to back the abrogation. 81
Immediately, the decision proved controversial, as law professor and
scholar Ali L. Khan noted, “[b]y revoking Articles 370 and 35A, India
has seemingly abandoned the notion of J&K state as a special territory
deserving autonomy.” 82 Protests and debates about the
constitutionality of the decision ensued. Several petitions were filed
challenging the constitutionality of the abrogation, but the Supreme
Court has sided with the government, affirming the constitutionality
of the abrogation. 83
Whether the decision to remove Kashmir’s special protection
status was constitutional is up for debate. Those who find the decision
to be constitutional often draw upon a 1961 Indian Supreme Court
decision, Puranlal Lakhanpal v. The President of India, to justify their
Id. at 15.
See Khan, supra note 48.
81
Full text of document on govt.’s rationale behind removal of special status to J&K,
THE HINDU (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/full-text-ofdocument-on-govts-rationale-behind-removal-of-special-status-tojk/article28821368.ece.
82
Khan, supra note 48.
83
Murali Krishnan, Article 370 matter stays with 5-judge bench, SC accepts govt’s
stand, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.hindustantimes.com/indianews/no-need-for-larger-bench-rules-supreme-court-on-plea-on-scrapping-article370/story-OgFNM16BpwyvcQh5QswT7I.html.
79
80
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position. 84 There, the Indian Supreme Court held that the President of
India may modify Constitutional provisions for its application to
Kashmir. 85 On the other hand, others underscore that the case may not
provide for the sweeping application of India’s constitution to J&K
altogether. 86 Those who maintain that the abrogation of J&K’s special
protection status was unconstitutional often rely upon the 1973 Indian
Supreme Court decision, Kesavanda Bharati v. State of Kerala. 87 There,
the Indian Supreme Court found that the basic structure and principles
of the Indian Constitution were not amendable through any process. 88
Therefore, some contend that Articles 370 and 35A are basic structures
and principles of the Indian Constitution, and are therefore not
amendable, let alone entirely revocable. 89 In its response to petitions
concerning the constitutionality of the decision, the Government of
India focused on the fact that the provisions were always intended to
be temporary. 90 Furthermore, the Government’s affidavit in support of
the abrogation provided, “[t]he militants and separatist elements, with
the support of foreign forces inimical to India, were taking advantage
of the situation and sowing discord, discontent, and even secessionist
feelings among the populace of the State,” and that, “[w]hat is more,
the residents of the erstwhile state were also being denied all the
benefits of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India to all
other citizens of the country.” 91 Thus, there are competing arguments
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on whether the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35AA was
constitutional.
III.

DID THE ABROGATION OF ARTICLES 370 AND 35A VIOLATE
LAW?

INTERNATIONAL

Under international law, Kashmir’s special protection status
granted an additional degree of autonomy. The previous legal
framework provided Kashmiris greater control over their own laws
relating to property, ownership, and other local issues, as well as the
ability to determine the qualifications for permanent residency. 92 This
section will examine whether Kashmir has the right to enjoy this
greater autonomy under general and customary international law.
Specifically, this section will look to the international legal standards
regarding autonomy regimes, minority rights, and the right to selfdetermination. Lastly, this section will balance Kashmir’s right to selfdetermination with India’s duty to protect under international law.
A.

KASHMIRIS’ RIGHT TO ENJOY AN AUTONOMY REGIME

Autonomy regimes are defined as “regions of a State, usually
possessing some ethnic or cultural distinctiveness, which have been
granted separate powers of internal administration, to whatever
degree, without being detached from the State of which they are
part.” 93 Autonomy, specifically, is defined as, “a device to allow ethnic
or other groups that claim a distinct identity to exercise direct control
over affairs of special concern to them while allowing the larger entity
to exercise those powers that cover common interests.” 94 Autonomy
may be granted under a variety of legal arrangements, as there exists
no uniformity with respect to the terms and legal structures of
autonomy. 95 The creation of an autonomy regime is not derived from
international law, but instead from the state’s own constitution or
Aljazeera, supra note 51.
Yoram Dinstein, Autonomy Regimes an International Law, 56 VILL. L. REV. 437,
437 (2011).
94
YASH GHAI, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 484
(Paul C. Stern & Daniel Druckman eds., 2000).
95
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legislation. 96 Under general international law, there is generally no
binding obligation for a state to create or to maintain an autonomy
regime. 97 Therefore, if specific provisions of a constitution or
legislation concerning the autonomy regime is breached, generally,
remedies are sought through the relevant domestic legal system. 98
One exception to this is when an autonomy regime is provided
for under a bilateral treaty or a recommendation from an international
organization. 99 However, there are often dramatic political
consequences that follow the abolishment of autonomy regimes. “An
attempt to abolish unilaterally an autonomy regime is bound to have
grave political reverberations . . . but, legally speaking, if the
foundation of the autonomy regime is solely domestic, the State is only
required to observe the strictures of its own legal system as regards to
constitutional or legislative amendments . . . .” 100 Resultantly, because
of the lack of general international legal standards surrounding
autonomy regimes, Kashmir likely does not hold the right to an
autonomy regime under general international law.
Additionally, Kashmir likely does not have the right to an
autonomy regime under customary international law. There are
several instances of autonomy regimes around the world. For example,
Denmark created an autonomy regime for Greenland with the Home
Rule Act of 1979, for which additional powers were granted to
Greenland’s local government 30 years after it was created. 101
However, customary international law does not necessitate an
obligation to create or maintain autonomy regimes once the regime is
established. For instance, China did not honor promises of autonomy
to Tibet, and neither did Sudan to its southern province. 102 Moreover,
once an autonomy regime is created, the international community is
unlikely to intervene in the internal domestic affairs of the state. 103
However, Eritrea and Kosovo demonstrate that once a state grants an
Dinstein, supra note 93, at 438.
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autonomy regime and revokes it unilaterally, the abolition often
radicalizes the situation and increases the likelihood of secession. 104
Thus, international law allows states to develop autonomy
regimes, but international law does not provide that these autonomy
regimes are irrevocable. Therefore, India did not breach any duty to
maintain Kashmir’s autonomy regime by removing its special
protection status.
B.

KASHMIRIS’ RIGHT TO MINORITY PROTECTIONS

There is no international, unanimous definition of what
constitutes a minority. Minority status is both a question of fact and
encompasses objective and subjective factors. 105 Minorities may be
differentiated by one or more observable human characteristic, such as
ethnicity, race, religion, caste, gender, socioeconomic status, ableness,
or sexual orientation. 106 Minority groups are often exposed to
differential treatment within society, including discrimination based
on perceived membership to the minority group. 107 Discrimination
against minority groups may also occur indirectly, as a result of
unequal societal structures. 108
International law has set the foundations for minority groups’
collective right to autonomy. Article 27 of UN International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, (“ICCPR”) states that, “[i]n those States
in which ethnic religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other minorities of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, or profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language.” 109 Scholar Rudiger Wolfrum interpreted this provision,
noting that, “Article 27 has to be understood as providing a minimum
Dinstein, supra note 93, at 446.
Minorities Under International Law, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE
HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/minorities/pages/internationallaw.
aspx.
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of protection against enforced integration or assimilation.” 110 As
scholar and professor Yoram Dinstein noted, “what contemporary
international law rejects is the construct of an enforced national
melting pot, which would deny protected minorities the right to be
different from the majority of the population of the State in which they
live.” 111
On December 18, 1992, the UN General Assembly issued a
declaration, on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious or Linguistic Minorities which provided that: “States shall
protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and
linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and
shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.” 112 The
Declaration further highlights that: “Persons belonging to minorities
have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national
and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to
which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a matter not
incompatible with national legislation.” 113
Regional law is additionally increasingly trending towards
providing minority groups’ rights to autonomy. For instance, the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE)
Copenhagen Document, although not legally binding in itself,
recognized that: “The participating States note the efforts taken to
protect and create conditions for the promotion of ethnic, cultural,
linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by
establishing, as one of the possible means to achieve the aims,
appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the
specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities and
in accordance with the policies of the State concerned.” 114 However,
Dinstein noted on this provision, “[i]t is striking that the text does not
even include a ‘clear recommendation to establish autonomy.’” 115 In
Dinstein, supra note 93, at 440.
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1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe drafted a
proposed protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on the rights of national
minorities, where Article 11 provided:
[I]n the regions where they are in a majority the persons
belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their
disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a
special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation
and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state. 116
However, this protocol was ultimately not adopted. Thus,
although there is a growing trend towards recognizing that minorities
have autonomy rights under international law, this right is still
developing and not well-established.
It is unlikely that Kashmiris hold minority status under
international law. Historically, Kashmir was not separate from the
remainder of the Indian subcontinent, and during British rule, it was
treated as one of the princely states, similar to several current states of
India. The primary distinguishing factor of Kashmir is its majorityMuslim population—the only majority-Muslim population in India,
aside from union territory, Lakshadweep. Because of Kashmir’s semiautonomous status within India prior to 2019, one could argue that
Muslims were not a minority for legal purposes. Ironically, by
abrogating Articles 370 and 35A, the Indian government has enabled
the Kashmiri Muslim community to more easily claim minority status.
However, although Kashmiri Muslims may be minorities under
international law by virtue of being a Muslim community in Hindumajority India, the protections for minorities are likely not strong
enough under international law to provide them with special
protection status.
C.

KASHMIRIS’ RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The right to self-determination is well-established under
international human rights law. The right to self-determination is
presented in Article 1 of the UN Charter, enacted in 1945, which
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, AN ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
HUMAN RIGHTS ON NATIONAL MINORITIES, art. 11, (Jan. 19, 1993), http://www.
assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=6772&lang=EN.
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provides that: “The Purposes of the United Nations are . . . to develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples. . . .” 117 The right to selfdetermination is also enshrined in the ICCPR: “All peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.” 118 Additionally, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) states
in Article 1: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” 119 Some
international jurists have even argued that the right to selfdetermination is so intrinsic to international human rights that it
should be jus cogens. 120
There are two kinds of self-determination recognized under
international law: internal self-determination and external selfdetermination. External self-determination is a right which, “concerns
the international status of a people,” specifically, “the recognition that
each people has the right to constitute itself a nation-state or to
integrate into or federate with, an existing state.” 121 In international
law, it is traditionally accepted that the external right to selfdetermination only applies to circumstances in which a people is
oppressed or the “mother state’s government does not legitimately
represent the people’s interests . . . .” 122 In contrast, internal selfdetermination, “means only that the states should not, through
appeals or pressure, seek to prevent people from freely selecting its
own political, economic, and social system.” 123 With respect to selfdetermination of minorities, Max van der Stoel stated that because
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
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external self-determination to minority groups in the world would
prompt the creation of around 2,000 independent states, greater
emphasis should instead be placed on internal self-determination to
ensure that national minorities express their full identity and are able
to live free and “achieve their aims, especially in the cultural and
educational fields.” 124
It is doubtful that Delhi’s abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A
violated Kashmir’s right to external self-determination under
international law. The matter of external self-determination only
applies if it is determined that the current population is oppressed. 125
This is a debatable position, especially because the abrogation
integrates Kashmir with the remainder of India, so that the Indian
Constitution applies to Kashmir like other Indian states and union
territories. 126 However, it is possible that Kashmiris’ right to internal
self-determination may be violated under international law, as it is
possible that the Muslim majority in Kashmir will be diluted, and
India’s political power will be consolidated in the region. 127 Moreover,
now as a union territory, Kashmir is directly governed by the Central
Government, without its own separate governing body. 128 Thus, the
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internal but not external right to self-determination may be implicated
when India removed Kashmir’s special protection status. 129
D.
BALANCING KASHMIR’S RIGHT TO INTERNAL SELFDETERMINATION WITH INDIA’S SECURITY RIGHTS AND DUTY TO
PROTECT
If India breached Kashmir’s right to internal selfdetermination, this violation must be balanced with India’s duty to
protect under international law, also known as humanitarian
intervention. The responsibility to protect endows states with great
discretion to take measures that might otherwise violate international
legal standards. As the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the
Responsibility to Protect stated, “the responsibility to protect
embodies a political commitment to end the worst forms of violence
and persecution.” 130 Additionally, the UN has stipulated that, “the
duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities lies first and
foremost with the State, but the international community has a role
that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty.” 131
The responsibility to protect has been affirmed in various
international human rights documents, but it is a relatively recent
concept. The 2005 World Outcome stipulated that, “each individual
State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity…the
international community also has the responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means…to help to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and

129
See Akhilesh Pillalamarri, Long Overdue: Why Ladakh’s New Status in India
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crimes against humanity.” 132 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s
2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, which helps to
operationalize the term, “responsibility to protect,” provides that the
responsibility solely applies to four types of crimes and violations:
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity. 133 Ban Ki-moon’s report from 2012, Responsibility to protect
– timely and decisive response, stipulated that “[t]he essence of
‘responsibility while protecting’ is doing the right thing, in the right
place, at the right time and for the right reasons. Timely and decisive
action puts a premium on assessment, on understanding what is
happening, why it is happening, and how the international
community can help keep a difficult situation from becoming
worse.” 134
Most relevant to the current Kashmir query is a series of
measures that states can take in order to prevent atrocity crimes. The
Secretary General’s report of 2013, Responsibility to protect: State
responsibility and prevention, provided that “[c]onstitutional
protections, when upheld, can contribute to creating a society based
on non-discrimination.” 135 Moreover, the report provided that “the
diffusion and sharing of power can engender political pluralism,
which promotes the peaceful coexistence of different interests.” 136 The
report also highlighted that atrocity crimes are more likely to take
place during an armed conflict, and also established that societies with
patterns of discrimination are risk factors, “[p]ersistent discrimination
establishes divisions within society that serve both as a material cause
and as a perceived justification of group violence. Without group-level
discrimination, even deep-seated grievances are unlikely to transform
into patterns of abuse that give rise to atrocity crimes.” 137
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The 2013 report also explained the role of gender
discrimination in atrocity crimes, establishing that
[g]ender discrimination and inequality increase
underlying risks associated with sexual and genderbased violence, which can constitute genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity in some
circumstances. Specific gender
discrimination
practices include the denial or inadequate protection of
basic rights relating to physical security and the status
of women, compulsory birth control, and access to
services and property. 138
The report further provided that
the risk of atrocity crimes is often connected to the
presence of armed groups or militia and their capacity
to commit atrocity crimes. Armed groups or militia
may be allied with the State or a particular population
sector. Associated risks include the proliferation of
arms, including small arms, and the ability of armed
groups to support their operations financially . . . . 139
Interestingly, all the aforementioned risk factors of armed
conflict, 140 gender-based discrimination, 141 and armed groups allied
with a particular population sector 142 are present in the Kashmir
predicament.
Thus, one could argue that the level of conflict and
discrimination present in the Kashmir region enabled India to revoke
Kashmir’s special protection status, despite the potential breach of
Kashmir’s right to self-determination. India may specifically argue
that abrogating Articles 370 and 35A was an internationally lawful act
because the risk of atrocity was high enough to justify taking
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constitutional measures to ensure peace and security in the region. 143
Because states are afforded ample discretion when acting under the
duty to protect, it is likely that such arguments would pass muster
under international law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The removal of Kashmir’s special protection status was likely
an internationally lawful act. Kashmir’s special protection status
essentially granted Kashmiris an autonomy regime. This article
therefore examined three distinct theories: (1) the right to autonomy
within an autonomy regime; (2) the right to autonomy under minority
protections; and (3) the right to autonomy under self-determination.
Lastly, this article balanced a potential breach of Kashmir’s selfdetermination with India’s duty to protect and ensure peace and
security. This article concludes that although rights to autonomy
regimes, and minority rights more broadly, are developing under
international law, they are currently too weak to provide Kashmir with
irrevocable special protection status. The article additionally found
that while India likely did not breach Kashmiris’ right to external selfdetermination, it is possible that India’s actions will result in a
violation of Kashmiris’ right to internal self-determination. Even so, it
is unlikely that such a claim could succeed under international law, as
India has great discretion under which to act within its duty to protect.
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